make it). This specific occasion of the "parliament" was devoted to a "trial" of the Code Noir, a copy of an original edition of which (a strangely diminutive text) was on display in a glass case at the nearby Neue Galerie as part of the larger exhibition. The title of my presentation was "Irreparable In this conjuncture, my concern, above all, is to reorient our thinking about New World slavery in the direction of a moral and reparatory history. I want to think of New World slavery as part not only of the social, political, legal, cultural, and economic history of the present but also of its moral history. I am using "moral" history here restrictedly as the covering name for an interpretative historiographical orientation that centers our attention on the perpetration of past acts-social and systemic-of large-scale atrocity and especially on the moral-psychological harms that these have brought about.
2 Moral history, in other words, is a history-of-the-present of past orders of evil, forms 
3
The question of evil has been reflated in certain critical agendas, marked by the publication of a number of provocative philosophic texts. 6 Without trying here to sort through the various approaches that run through these works, what is important for my purposes is the wider conceptual problemspace they share that seems to animate the idea of evil with a quickened intellectual relevance.
To begin with, this is a problem-space shaped, as I've already suggested, by the exhaustion of 3 I borrow the idea of an "order of evil" from Adi Ophir, self-confidence in the powers of reason to identify the sources of our discontent and to offer the rational basis of a path beyond it. In these discourses, the future was an assured prospect, the past a time to rapidly leave behind. By contrast, something about what is wrong with our present world (not least our economic and environmental worlds) seems more opaque, less amenable to rational analysis. Certainly, we have now lost any real confidence in our capacity to understand, much less fix, our world. In short, the exhaustion of these narratives of rational progress leaves us with a less transparent world, a darker, more mysterious, and less readily intelligible one. And with this darkening a conceptual void has opened in which a postsecular evil has acquired critical force as a way of marking an extremity of human experience, of human violation, of human suffering.
Needless to say, in the portentous archive of the new literature, the Holocaust is the paradigm instance of historical moral wrong. By contrast, New World slavery scarcely appears-and when it does appear, barely sustains that appearance. Rather, the Holocaust stands as a unique and unparalleled order of evil that not only supersedes all others but also frames their intelligibility.
Undoubtedly, in many ways it is the work of Hannah Arendt that has given a certain impetus and direction to contemporary considerations of evil and to the prevailing place of the Holocaust in them. Famously, in an early review, "Nightmare and Flight," she offered the prescient suggestion that "the problem of evil will be the fundamental question of post-war intellectual life in Europe-as death became the fundamental problem after the last war." 7 Not that Arendt's thinking about evil has been either systematic or uncomplicated. It is well known, after all, that her ideas underwent something of a transformation-between her earlier conceptualization in the 1951 book The Origins of Totalitarianism, in which she uses Kant's late idea (1793) of "radical evil" to frame a discussion of the concentration camps as killing machines that produced death for the sake of death, and her later conceptualization in the 1963 book Eichmann in Jerusalem, in which she develops her controversial idea of the "banality of evil" to evoke the mindless administration of killing in which genocide occurred as an aspect of a thoughtless organization of systematic death carried out by minor functionaries. 8 This is not the place to interrogate these extraordinarily influential ideas.
What is notable for our purposes is that in both formulations, despite the evident differences, it is the association of evil with systematic death by killing that remains the central idea. The point and purpose of the organization of evil, it seems, is the perpetration of death.
4
New World slavery was an order of evil. But it was an order of evil differently organized than the Holocaust in relation to much-including in relation to death. As everyone knows, New World slavery was built on a pervasive practice of systemic violence. The African or African-descended slave 7 See Hannah Arendt, " Nightmare and Flight" (1945) , in Jerome Kahn, ed., Essays in Understanding, 1930 -1954 (New York: Schocken, 1994 , 134. 8 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, 1951) , and Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report of the Banality of Evil (New York: Viking, 1963 ).
x [ David Scott ] Preface: Evil Beyond Repair was a subject whose legal and existential status was one of continuous and arbitrary exposure to violent death. This was the point of the Code Noir. The slave was a body that could legally be disposed of at will. And yet the singular peculiarity of New World slavery was that, institutionally, it depended as much (or more) on life as on death-or rather, it depended on the production and reproduction of a certain kind of life, namely, dead life. Orlando Patterson's theory of social death, I
want to suggest, is as much a moral theory as a social-historical one. Or, to put it slightly differently, As I say, I do not believe that slavery is a reparable evil. Perhaps no evil is, but slavery certainly isn't. And yet its essential irreparability should not preclude-indeed, paradoxically, should drivethe moral indictment of slavery in the contemporary Americas and the white supremacist politics that lives on in the disavowals of its beneficiaries. In this sense, note that the problem of reparatory justice is not (necessarily) a "forward-oriented" one (to use the language of justice-as-reconciliation).
Postslavery politics, as I wish to commend it, stores no utopian hope in the long-deferred futures of a reconciliatory emancipation. Reparatory politics, rather, is a demand for neither equality nor fairness. It is a demand now for what is owed for what was taken, morally and materially, symbolically and spiritually, a demand that includes the recognition that the unforgivable wrong of generations of enslavement has given rise to a permanent racial debt that, while it can never be finally discharged, has necessarily to be honored before any common future of freedom can begin.
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